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On Legal Reform: Legal Stability and
Legislative Questions
By MICHAEL D. BAYLES*
INTRODUCTION
The respective roles of courts and legislatures in reform of
the common law is of continuing interest and importance. Phi-
losophers, especially rule utilitarians,' frequently refer to the
distinction between issues appropriate for judicial determina-
tion (judicial questions) and those more suitable for legislative
resolution (legislative questions) as though it were clear, yet
legal philosophers have not seriously examined the grounds for
such a distinction. As used by philosophers and judges, the
distinction frequently implies the discredited Blackstonian
view that judges discover and apply law but do not make it. In
his often cited statement of this distinction, even Justice
Holmes, certainly no adherent to the Blackstonian view, em-
ploys the distinction:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabili-
ties as they stand on present or past facts and under laws
supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legis-
lation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied there-
after to all or some part of those subject to its power.2
The question of the role of courts vis-A-vis legislatures in
law reform has increased in practical importance during the
last fifteen years. In the United States at least, there has been
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1962, University of Illi-
nois; M.A. 1963, University of Missouri; Ph.D. 1967, Indiana University. The author
wishes to thank Robert Keeton, Hilde Hein, and Howard Darmstadter for valuable
criticisms of earlier drafts of this article.
Rule utilitarians claim that acts are to be morally evaluated by their conformity
to those rules which, if adopted, would produce more net utility (happiness) than the
adoption of any other rules. For use of the distinction between judicial and legislative
questions in this connection, see Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in UTrARurISM wrrm
CRITIcAL ESSAYS 177 (S. Gorovitz ed. 1971).
2 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
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a noticeable increase in judicial activism in both the Supreme
Court and state courts of final review. Although it has abated
somewhat in recent years, there has been an increased tend-
ency for courts to overrule prior decisions.3 Yet, in many cases
judges have insisted either that stare decisis prevents courts
from making changes or that it is more appropriate for the
legislature than the courts to make them. Judicial reluctance
to depart from precedent is illustrated in Maki v. Frelk,4 a
negligence action for personal injuries, in which the Supreme
Court of Illinois had asked an appellate court to determine
whether contributory negligence should continue to be recog-
nized as a defense. The appellate court decided that it should
not. Yet on rehearing, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the
judgment on the ground that abolition of the defense of contri-
butory negligence should be left to the legislature.5
The main thesis of this article is that there is less reason
for distinguishing between the proper roles of courts and legis-
latures in reform of the common law than is generally recog-
nized. The doctrine of stare decisis has caused much confusion
on this point. In particular, its use in cases raising the issue of
overruling previous decisions often confusestwo distinct ques-
tions: (1) Whether the law should be changed; and (2) who
should change the law. The first section of this article analyzes
stare decisis in order to clarify its status and to show how
distinct considerations relevant to answering these two ques-
tions are confused in it. The second section analyzes the rea-
sons for a principle against changing the law-the principle of
stability-and demonstrates that it applies equally to both leg-
islative and judicial change of the common law. The third sec-
tion analyzes functional differences between courts and legisla-
tures as a basis for a standard of legislative questions indicat-
ing which issues of change of the common law courts should
leave to legislatures.
3 With respect to tort law, see R. KEErON, VENTUPING TO Do JUSTicE 169-70 (1969).
239 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 1968).
1 Because a majority of states now have comparative rather than contributory
negligence and three states adopted it by judicial decision, this controversy makes a
good case study. Indeed, the courts in Florida and California adopted comparative
negligence despite statutes arguably requiring contributory negligence. Kaatz v. State,
540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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I. THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
The doctrine of stare decisis or precedent (rarely are the
two clearly distinguished) may be construed in several different
ways. First, the doctrine may be understood either as a doc-
trine which specifies the kinds of reasons relevant to judicial
decision-making, or as a specific reason in itself.' As a doctrine
pertaining to the relevancy of reasons, stare decisis is the claim
that the only relevant reasons for judicial decisions are preced-
ents or analogies to precedents. So construed, stare decisis is a
meta-doctrine concerning the underlying reasons courts give
for decisions and not itself a reason. More often, stare decisis
is considered to be one among a number of reasons for judicial
decisions. So interpreted, it states that courts ought to adhere
to or follow precedents, but other reasons may be given for not
following precedents. Thus, according to the first interpreta-
tion, wherein stare decisis is construed as a meta-doctrine, all
arguments for decisions must be based on precedents, whether
in accord with or contrary to them. The second interpretation
of stare decisis, however, is that while good reasons exist for
basing decisions on precedent, reasons other than precedent
may also exist which justify deviation from precedent. It is this
latter conception which is relevant here. Of course, it is a diffi-
cult and controversial task to determine the holding of a pre-
vious case. Herein it will be assumed that this task has been
performed. One cannot sensibly ask whether a precedent ought
to be followed until one has determined what it is.
Second, one may distinguish between the precedents stare
decisis requires a court to follow. In one version, it only requires
courts to follow the precedents of higher courts of the same
jurisdiction. In another version, it requires courts to follow their
own precedents as well. Since the present concern is with
courts of final review, only the claim that courts ought to follow
their own precedents is relevant to the present discussion, there
being no higher courts in the jurisdiction. Moreover, the claim
that courts ought to follow their own precedents may take two
forms: strict or liberal.7 The strict or English doctrine of stare
'See R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDIciAL DECISION 53 (1961).




decisis requires that courts always adhere to their own preced-
ents, whereas the liberal or American doctrine permits depar-
ture from precedent in some cases. Although it is unclear
whether any court ever really applied the strict doctrine, it has
substantially been put to rest by a recent Practice Statement
of the House of Lords which declared that courts may depart
from precedent "when it appears right to do so."' Conse-
quently, only the liberal version of the doctrine will be consid-
ered.
Third, one may distinguish the doctrine's application to
different kinds of law. The justification for the doctrine of stare
decisis and the strength of the reason it provides for adherence
to precedent may vary depending upon the type of law in-
volved. The most significant distinctions here are between (1)
court-made rules (common law), (2) statutory interpretations,
and (3) constitutional interpretations. The role of courts as
concerns their ability to decide constitutional matters largely
depends upon considerations peculiar to specific forms of gov-
ernment, e.g., whether there is a written constitution and judi-
cial review. In statutory interpretation also, the respective roles
of courts and legislatures are more clearly delineated than in
common law. It is in the area of common law, the focus of this
article, that the most difficult and general issues arise
Thus far, stare decisis has been referred to as a doctrine.
In this context, the term "doctrine" has no clear meaning. It
is thus useful to introduce the more precise terminology of
standards, principles, and rules. 10 Standards such as good
faith, due care, and fair rate provide a basis for evaluations
which admit degrees and may be used to establish rankings.
Such evaluations are frequently stated in terms of good, better,
best, bad, worse, and worst. Principles, on the other hand,
present the criteria (good- and bad-making characteristics)
used in applying standards and may themselves refer to char-
8 [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234, 3 All E.R. 77 (H.L.).
Moreover, within the common law, the weight of the reason provided against
change by the doctrine of stare decisis may vary depending upon whether tort, con-
tract, property, or criminal law is involved.
I* On the difference between legal standards, principles, and rules, see generally
Bayles, Legal Principles, Rules and Standards, 14 LOGIQUE ET ANALYSE 223 (1971);
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. Rav. 14 (1967); and Dworkin, Social Rules
and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855, 882-90 (1972).
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acteristics which admit degrees, e.g., the ripeness of an apple
in grading it. Rules are used in making evaluations which do
not admit degrees; they are either complied with or not. Such
evaluations are usually expressed in terms of right or wrong,
correct or incorrect. Thus, rules apply in an all or none fashion,
whereas principles do not, since the various principles consti-
tuting a standard may be weighed against one another. For
example, it is a rule that one who is contributorily negligent
cannot recover for damages. The requirement that liability
ought to be based on fault, on the other hand, is a principle
because it may be balanced against other considerations.
Determining whether the law should be changed requires
consideration of the factor of the stability of the law. In partic-
ular, a decision to change the law cannot be made solely on the
basis of the merits of the existing and the proposed rules but
must also include consideration of the disadvantages or costs
of legal change." In this context, the liberal doctrine of stare
decisis cannot be treated as a rule. 12 This conclusion is predi-
cated upon the theory that to be construed as a rule against
change, it would be necessary for the liberal doctrine to consist
of one of the following forms: (a) Precedents ought to be fol-
lowed unless ... ; or (b) precedents ought usually or generally
to be followed.
When given form (a), however, the doctrine often reduces
to a tautology as in the House of Lords formulation that one
ought to adhere to precedent unless it appears right to depart
from it. 3 If, on the other hand, the "unless" clause is formu-
lated so as not to reduce to a tautology, then the rule provides
no reason at all against change whenever a case falls within the
excepting "unless" clause. Yet, stare decisis always provides a
reason for adhering to precedent, notwithstanding the fact that
other factors may outweigh the factor of adherence to preced-
ent. Consequently, stare decisis cannot be a rule of type (a).
Nor can stare decisis be treated as a rule of type (b). As
such, stare decisis is a mere summarization of the results of
"1 R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 6, at 173; see also W. SHAEFER, PRECEDENT AND
PoLcY 9 (1956).
12 Contra, R. WASSEirSRoM, supra note 6, at 53-54. On the basis of quite different
considerations, Wise also claims stare decisis is not a rule. Wise, supra note 7, at 1043.
13 [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234, 3 All E.R. 77 (H.L.).
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considering the advantages and disadvantages of legal change
in particular cases. Without explicitly so stating, Wasserstrom,
in his utilitarian theory of judicial decision, treats stare decisis
as a rule of this type.' 4 He requires that to justify a judicial
decision "the rule upon which its justification depends must be
shown to be desirable, and its introduction into the legal sys-
tem itself desirable."' 5 This view considers only the disadvan-
tages of change of the particular law in question.'6 Hence,
whenever in a particular case the advantages of change out-
weigh the disadvantages, a new rule should be introduced. Yet
in focusing upon the disadvantages of change of a particular
rule, Wasserstrom has omitted consideration of the disadvan-
tages of a practice of frequent change. However, as D. H. Hodg-
son has argued at length, Wasserstrom's view would make the
law quite uncertain. Lawyers would not be able to predict
when a court might decide that it would be useful to change a
rule. Yet certainty in the law (as discussed more fully in the
next section) is one of the main reasons for stare decisis or
stability. Thus, because it is essential to have one settled rule,
a reason is provided for adhering to a previously settled rule
although it is no better than another one.
As it concerns the stability of law, stare decisis is a legal
principle, the principle of stability. It is one of the principles
constituting the standard of the appropriate rule to apply in a
case and may be weighed against other relevant principles. As
a principle, stability provides a reason in and of itself for apply-
ing an extant rather than a proposed rule. Basing the choice of
a rule solely on a straightforward utilitarian calculation of the
merits of the extant and proposed rules (a calculation which
may include the disadvantages of change of the particular rule)
is thereby foreclosed because of the failure to consider the prin-
ciple of stability.'8
R . WASSERSTROM, supra note 6.
, Id. at 173.
, In essence, this is an act utilitarianism view.
I? D. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTIITARIANISM 104-08 (1967).
" However, consequentialist or utilitarian considerations may be relevant to the
justification of principles. This view adds another level to rule utilitarianism. Instead
of directly evaluating rules by their utility, rules are evaluated by principles which, in
turn, may be justified by utility or other considerations.
[Vol. 65
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As applied to the issue of whether courts should introduce
legal change, stare decisis involves a standard. The standard
is that of legislative questions, those which courts should leave
to legislatures. The various principles which constitute this
standard must be weighed against one another in particular
cases to determine whether it is appropriate for a court to de-
cide a question.
Thus, the doctrine of stare decisis consists of two elements:
(1) A principle of stability; and (2) a standard of legislative
questions. With respect to the proper role of courts in reform
of the common law, two issues are presented: First, does the
principle of stability apply more strongly with respect to judi-
cial than to legislative reform? Second, what are the principles
or criteria of the standard of legislative questions?
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF STABILITY
One must examine the considerations which justify the
principle of stability before determining whether it provides a
reason against judicial change of common law rules. Five im-
portant considerations support the principle of stability: The
need for certainty; fairness to those who have relied upon the
extant rule; the efficiency of following precedent; the need for
continuity in the law; and equality in treating similar cases
similarly. Each of these considerations needs to be more fully
elucidated.'9
Certainty of the law is obviously a significant considera-
tion. Essentially, it may be equated with the ability to predict
the legal consequences of one's conduct. One must recognize
the limits of this consideration. The argument for certainty
may be pressed too far as in the following dissent of Chief
Justice Bell of Pennsylvania:
Unless the Courts establish and maintain certainty and sta-
bility in the law, businessmen cannot safely and wisely make
contracts with their employees or with each other; the mean-
ing of wills, bonds, contracts, deeds and leases will fluctuate
and change with each change in the personnel or in the
changing views of a Court; property interests will be jeopard-
ized and frequently lost or changed; Government cannot ade-
" See generally R. WAssEamoM, supra note 6, at 60-74.
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quately protect law-abiding persons or communities against
criminals; private citizens will not know their rights and obli-
gations; and public officials will not know from week to week
or month to month the powers and limitations of govern-
ment.0
Were there no predictability at all, the dire results Chief Jus-
tice Bell depicts would ensue. However, the fact that a com-
plete lack of predictability would be disastrous does not justify
the conclusion that some unpredictability would be so. One
must balance the advantages of being able to change outmoded
rules and predictability. The principle of stability occupies a
middle ground between Bell's argument against all change and
Wasserstrom's allowance of change whenever the advantages of
change in a particular case outweigh the disadvantages.
Reliance is closely related to certainty. Although reliance
is based upon predictability, the interest involved is somewhat
different. Predictability refers to the ability to predict what the
legal consequences of conduct will be, while reliance pertains
to the effect a change of the law will have upon people who have
acted on the basis of predictions. A subsequent change in the
law involves unfairness to those who have relied upon a pre-
viously well-established rule even though the new rule may be
a more just one. The concern is not, as Hodgson suggests, how
long a rule has been relied upon, but the extent to which it has
been relied upon, i.e., how many people, how often." Moreover,
the injustice or unfairness occasioned by changes in the law to
those who have acted in reliance upon the law depends upon
whether that reliance was justifiable.22 To the extent that the
existing rule is clearly contrary to community standards or
where there are dicta and dissenting opinions indicating a de-
sire to change it, reliance is less justified; that is, it is less
10 Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 243 A.2d 395, 399 (Pa. 1968). This point is similar to Lon
Fuller's argument that too rapid a change in laws would result in the absence of a legal
system. L. FULLER, THE MoRALaTy OF LAW 39, 79-81 (rev. ed. 1969).
22 "The longer a rule has been relied upon by the profession and the public, the
less willing a court will be to reject or qualify it." D. HODGSON, supra note 17, at 136
(emphasis added). Of course, the longer a rule has existed, the more people there are
likely to be who have relied upon it, but the time is not the crucial point.
22 Alferitz v. Borgwardt, 58 P. 460, 462 (Cal. 1899); R. KEETON, supra note 3, at
41-43; Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term, Foreward: The High Court, the Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 70 (1965).
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justifiable to expect the rule to remain unchanged. This consid-
eration, therefore, goes more to the pace of change than to the
existence of change itself.
Considerations of efficiency relate to the allocation of judi-
cial resources. A heavy burden would be placed upon courts if
each case were to be treated as one of first impression. In the
complete absence of the principle, each case could presumably
be taken all the way to the court of final review-at least there
would be no clear reason not to do so. Moreover, in each case
courts would have to raise anew all the arguments for and
against each rule, even though they would continually arrive at
the same conclusion when one rule is clearly preferable over
another.? When cases at the trial level clearly fall within the
boundaries of a precedent, it saves time and money for all
involved to follow precedent. Settlement rather than litigation
is encouraged. As Mill recognized, even in ethics most situa-
tions need not be considered anew because rules have been
worked out on the basis of previous experience. 24 Courts of final
review can consider only a few of all the cases in their jurisdic-
tions. Utilization of the principle of stability insures that few
previously settled issues will be appealed to them, thereby ena-
bling courts to devote their time and energy to issues of first
impression and those involving rules which create serious injus-
tice or disutility.
Continuity deals with the coherence or consistency of a
body of rules.2 5 A change in one rule may significantly affect a
number of other rules which were made upon the assumption
of the effectiveness of the extant rule. For example, change
from a rule of contributory negligence to one of comparative
negligence would cast doubt upon the status of a last clear
chance rule. A system of rules can be worked out by case law
only on the assumption that previous rules are still valid.26
2 Furthermore, rarely can an issue even be formulated without use of the principle
of stability. For example, the issue of whether a restrictive covenant in a lease is
enforceable presupposes a host of rules with respect to the nature and existence of
various property rights. All of these various presuppositions involve rules based on
precedents to which both parties agree. Were there no effect to precedent, all of these
presuppositions would be open to question and there would be no formulable issue or
issues short of justifying the bulk of property law.
24 J.S. MiLL, UTmrr=AnIsM wr OarrMAL EssAYs 29 (S. Gorovitz ed. 1971).
See D. HoDGSON, supra note 17, at 134-36.
" There is a difference between the rules which must be presupposed to formulate
1977]
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Moreover, although a new rule may not directly affect other
rules, it may rest upon a different principle than do the other
rules and thus produce incoherence or discontinuity at the level
of principles."7
The final consideration is equality. If courts were to decide
each case afresh without regard to precedent, they might reach
opposite conclusions in relevantly similar cases. When the jus-
tification for a rule is clear and it obviously applies to a case,
the chances of disparate decisions may be relatively small.
However, a decision as to which of two or more rules is the
better is often a close one about which reasonable judges may
disagree. In these cases, considerations of equality require that
the same rule be applied to similarly situated litigants.
The considerations of certainty, reliance, efficiency, conti-
nuity, and equality provide adequate justification for a court's
adherence to the principle of stability. These same factors are
also relevant to legislative decisions to change the law. Too
frequent legislative changes can have as serious an impact on
certainty of the law as too frequent judicial changes. Consider-
ations of reliance are also involved in legislative decision-
making. Indeed, reliance is the primary factor in the general
principle against retroactive legislation. However, since most
legislation is prospective while most judicial decisions are re-
trospective, reliance is a more important check on judicial than
on legislative change.2" Continuity is also a legislative consider-
ation. Legislators as well as judges ought to have regard for the
orderly development of law, especially as it concerns consist-
ency between laws. Considerations of equality and efficiency
are involved in the principle that legislation should be general;
that is, legislation should concern classes of persons and events
rather than particular ones.
Thus, the only difference between the considerations sup-
porting the principle of stability as it affects judicial as opposed
an issue and the rules presupposed in considerations of coherence between laws. The
latter presuppose the existence of the rule in question, but the rule in question does
not necessarily presuppose the existence of the rules which compose the other laws.
" Discontinuity at the level of principles is a tesult of the rapid change of direction
which overruling decisions may have. Such rapid change may additionally affect the
considerations of certainty and reliance.




to legislative change of the common law is reliance and the
retrospective character of judicial decisions. Overruling deci-
sions are usually retroactive. For example, a decision invalidat-
ing a divorce obtained by a private legislative bill would ordi-
narily invalidate all previous such divorces as well as that in
the instant case. In Bingham v. Miller the technique of pro-
spective overruling was, however, used to avoid such a result;
that is, the court held that past legislative divorces were valid,
but that no valid divorces could be obtained by that method
in the future." The definitive feature of prospective overruling
is, therefore, that the court limits the effect of the decision so
that is does not apply to all previous cases. Since prospective
overruling of precedents avoids the retrospective effect of judi-
cial reform, the one difference in the relevance of the principle
of stability as it applies to judicial and legislative change of the
common law is eliminated.
Before prospective overruling may be justified, one must
carefully consider the reliance factor upon which it is based, for
in the absence of justifiable reliance on the existing state of the
law, retroactive overruling is defensible. For example, reliance
may not have been justified because of previous judicial warn-
ings in dicta or dissents that the extant rule was in doubt.
Moreover, ordinary citizens are often not aware of judicial
opinions and may not have relied on them. Also, the impact of
a retroactive decision may not be very great on any individual.
For example, a change in tort liability may not have a serious
impact upon the losing party because the damages he owes
may be distributed amongst others via laibility insurance
rates. 0 Finally, the aspect of reliance may apply almost as
strongly when courts do not utilize the device of prospective
overruling, but, rather, distinguish an instant case from a pre-
vious one.31 Of course, to the extent the instant case differed
from previous ones, reliance upon the prior decisions was less
21 17 Ohio 445 (1848). Prospective overruling has also been used to ease the transi-
tion from contributory to comparative negligence. Li v. Yellow Cab. Co., 532 P.2d 1226,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). For a brief discussion of prospective overruling, see generally
S. MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYsTEM-AN INTRODUcTION 263-66 (1973).
N R. KEETON, supra note 3, at 42-43.
" W. SHAEFER, supra note 11, at 15. Distinguishing an instant case from preced-
ents may also decrease certainty and predictability. Wise, supra note 7, at 1056.
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justifiable. But to avoid the dead hand of precedent, courts
have frequently distinguished cases on unpredictable grounds.
The major argument against prospective overruling is
based upon equality. To see the force of this argument, one
must consider the possible and actual variations in prospective
overruling. In effect, courts set the date at which a new rule is
to become effective. Very rarely do courts set a definite date in
the future, such as forty days from the date of decision.3 2 Courts
more frequently use what has been called prospective-
prospective overruling, i.e., saying that the precedent will be
overruled in the next case.13 The variety of dates of effective-
ness which are possible in overruling is made apparent by the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court respecting the
retroactive application of constitutional rules of criminal pro-
cedure. The Court has allowed retroactive application to (1) all
cases; (2) all those in which direct review has not been com-
pleted; (3) all those which have not proceeded beyond a certain
point in the trial; (4) all those in which trials have not yet
commenced; and (5) the instant case and future cases in which
the proscribed conduct has not occurred as of the date of the
decision.3 4 Cases of type (1) are the ordinary form of retroactive
judicial decision, while those of types (2) through (5) involve
limits on the retroactive effect of the decision and are thus
versions of prospective overruling. Moreover, pure prospective
overruling is that in which the. new rule applies only to cases
arising after the date of decision. 5
Whatever date or point is used, some litigants may com-
plain of inequality because their relative similar cases were
decided differently. However, such inequality is always in-
volved when the law is changed. Similar cases are decided
differently before as well as after the change. 6 The relevant
consideration is the number of temporal inequalities involved
when the law is altered. For example, if a court first changes
3! Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1962).
3 Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 1969); Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962).
31Ostrager, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional
Interpretations, 19 N.Y.L. FORUM 289, 294-95 (1973).
The Supreme Court has rejected its use. Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301
(1967).
Keeton, Law Reform and Legal Education, 24 VAND. L. REv. 53, 57 (1970).
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from contributory negligence to limited comparative negli-
gence, and then, two years later, changes to pure comparative
negligence, within three years similar cases will have been
treated in different ways more frequently than would have been
the case had pure comparative negligence been adopted in the
first instance. There will have been two temporal inequalities
rather than one. This consideration applies equally to courts
and legislatures.
The United States Supreme Court has justified temporal
inequality by the impetus prospective overruling provides "for
implementation of long overdue reforms, which otherwise could
not be practicably effected. 137 The Court's language is unfor-
tunate in that it suggests that reforms are completely justified,
the only problems being those of administration. While the
Court has taken problems of administration into account as
one factor among others justifying prospective overruling,
3
they are not the central reason for its use. Rather, the reason
is more general in that unless a decision is prospective, the
consideration of reliance, which is obviated by prospective
overruling, would be sufficient to make the overruling unjusti-
fied. That is, unless some of the disadvantages of changing the
law are avoided, the change is not justifiable.
With the availability of prospective overruling, therefore,
the principle of stability provides no stronger reason against
judicial than against legislative change of the common law.39
Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969).
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
Prospective overruling is not generally available to English courts. Lord Simon
has indicated a desire to use it, but thinks that enabling legislation is required. Jones
v. Secretary of State for Social Services, [1972] 1 All E.R. 145, 198-99. But see
Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 1254 (H.L.), for a considera-
tion of the effect of prospective overruling without enabling legislation.
Ronald Dworkin, however, suggests another reason for applying the principle of
stability more strongly to courts than to legislatures. He distinguishes between princi-
ples involving distributive values (rights or claims of individuals) and policies involv-
ing collective values (goals or claims of the community). His essential claim, the
"rights" thesis, is that judicial arguments are and ought to be based on principles
(rights of the parties), while legislative arguments are and may be based on policies
as well as on principles. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1975). The rights
thesis thus has a descriptive version (how decisions are made) and a normative version
(how decisions ought to be made).
The principle of stability would thus be less stringent upon legislatures than upon
courts because the equality consideration is less strong for rules based upon policies
1977]
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Reliance is the only consideration underlying the principle of
stability which may operate more strongly against judicial than
against legislative legal change. Prospective overruling, how-
ever, eliminates any difference between courts and legislatures
with respect to reliance. Consequently, if a court considers the
possibility of prospective overruling, but correctly decides that
the principle of stability militates against change, the law
should not be changed by either a court or a legislature. Con-
versely, so far as the principle of stability is concerned, if it is
appropriate for a legislature to change a common law rule, then
it is also appropriate for a court to do so, at least by prospective
overruling. 0
than for those based upon principles. Since goals are not distributive, that a benefit
to one class would further economic efficiency does not imply that other classes are
entitled to a similar benefit. Id. at 1068. Similarly, since the economy may need
stimulus at one time, yet may not later, temporal inequality would not be significant.
However, the rights thesis does not have this implication for common law rules
which were originally adopted by courts. If the descriptive version of the rights thesis
is correct, then the rules were adopted on the basis of arguments from principle.
Consequently, the equality consideration for the principle of stability fully applies to
the common law rules, and legislators would be as constrained by the principle as are
judges. Moreover, cases of prospective overruling are prima facie counter-examples to
the rights thesis. If courts are not willing to apply rights retrospectively, they seem
either to be asserting that there is no right which the party had until the announcement
of the new rule or to be allowing policy considerations to affect the application of the
rule. Dworkin's only comment upon cases of prospective overruling adopts the former
alternative. He considers the criminal case, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965),
and claims that the rights thesis does not fully apply to criminal cases because the
prosecution does not have a right to a conviction if the defendant is guilty, although
the defendant does have a right to acquittal if innocent. In ordinary civil cases, he
claims, one or the other of the parties does have a right to win. Dworkin, supra at 1077-
78. Yet, the use of prospective overruling in tort cases appears to falsify the descriptive
version of the rights thesis.
40 Thus far, the principle of stability has been treated as a principle presenting a
reason against change which forecloses a straight-forward utilitarian calculation of the
advantages and disadvantages of change in a particular case. No account has been
given as to when this reason may be outweighed and overruling decisions justified.
Such an account is not central to the point of this article; it suffices to show that the
principle of stability provides no more reason against judicial than against legislative
change. The best such an account could do would be to present other principles calling
for change and to weigh them against the principle of stability. It should be noted that
the merits of the proposed rule over the extant one is such a principle. In making this
determination, the way in which a court construes the holding of the case relied upon
as precedent may be of prime importance and open to consideration. See Stone, The
Lords at the Crossroads-When to "Depart" and How!, 46 AusTRALL L.J. 483, 488
(1972).
The principle of stability, however, prevents adoption of a proposed rule whenever
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I-l. THE STANDARD OF LEGISLATIVE QUESTIONS
If the principle of stability does not provide a reason to
prefer legislative to judicial reform of the common law, then
the standard of legislative questions must bear that burden of
preference. The principles which constitute the criteria used in
the determination of legislative questions are based upon a
combination of functional differences between courts and legis-
latures and also upon the considerations underlying the princi-
ple of stability."
A. Functional Differences Between Courts and Legislatures
The most significant functional difference between courts
and legislatures is that courts, unlike legislatures, are limited
to deciding actual cases. The United States Constitution limits
article III courts to deciding cases and controversies.42 Although
not necessarily constitutionally so limited, most common law
courts are also restricted to deciding actual cases.13 Such a
limitation involves several elements. First, there must be a
definite, concrete issue involving particular parties; courts do
not decide general policy except in the context of a particular
case. Second, the issue must be an actual one; courts do not
generally decide hypothetical or moot cases.44 Third, courts
cannot decide an issue just because they think it an important
one deserving resolution. The issue must be brought to them.
However, this point must be qualified in two respects. Courts
it is preferable to the extant one, just as the obligation to keep promises prevents one
from breaking a promise whenever doing so would have better consequences than
keeping it. Yet, just as one may be justified in breaking a promise when the results of
so doing are much better than those of keeping it, one may also be justified in introduc-
ing a new rule when it is clearly better than the extant one.
1' The various principles specifying criteria for legislative questions developed in
this section rest on general functional differences between courts and legislatures, not
on those limited to particular legal systems. See generally S. MERMIN, supra note 29,
at 102-13.
11 See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 34-38 (2d
ed. 1970).
S. MERMIN, supra note 29, at 175.
" Sometimes they do. For example, M'Naghten's Case, which set forth the famous
tests of insanity, was not before the House of Lords in an actual case. [1843] 8 Eng.
Rep. 718 (H.L.). The defendant had died before the United States Supreme Court's
decision declaring unconstitutional those laws making the status of being a narcotic
addict a crime. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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of final review frequently exercise much control over the issues
they will decide. Moreover, they may sometimes decide a case
on an issue other than that on which it is argued. For example,
when the United States Supreme Court applied to the states
the rule excluding material obtained in unconstitutional
searches and seizures from evidence at trial, the case had been
granted certiorari and argued on an issue of obscenity." Fourth,
the plaintiff must state a cause of action or claim upon which
relief may be granted. There must be a legal basis for the
dispute before courts can take it up. But this limit is not abso-
lute. At least in common law, courts do have the power to
recognize new causes of action,4" and so, theoretically, new is-
sues can be recognized.
The functional limitation of courts to actual cases, there-
fore, significantly restricts their power as compared to that of
a legislature. Courts are not as free as legislatures to choose the
issues they wish to decide, and they must determine the spe-
cific legal situation of at least one legal person or entity. Legis-
latures, however, usually decide general issues without refer-
ence to the legal situation of any specific person.4"
Another set of functional differences involves what may be
called power over resources. Courts do not have a general tax-
ing and spending power. So, for example, they could not insti-
tute a social security system. The federal courts have generally
avoided issues of spending by determining that individual tax-
payers do not have standing to sue with respect to Congres-
sional spending decisions. Only when courts have the power to
constitutionally review legislation may they restrict spending
by legislatures, and even then they cannot say how money is
to be spent, only how it is not to be spent. This sort of limita-
tion does not imply that courts do not exercise functions simi-
lar to legislatures, but merely that they exercise fewer of them.
A related and more significant aspect of courts' limited power
4' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46 The procedure is not to recognize an entirely new cause of action, but to recog-
nize new claims for relief within a broad category such as negligence. See e.g., Dillon
v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). Eventually such decisions may lead to whole new bodies of
law, such as that of products liability.
" S. MERMIN, supra note 29, at 104.
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over resources concerns the gathering of information. Unlike
legislatures, courts generally cannot establish investigative
bodies to obtain information relevant to issues. They must gen-
erally rely upon the information presented by the parties to the
case.
A further functional difference between courts and legisla-
tures relates to the acceptability of compromise. Legislatures
are expected to compromise competing interests. Thus, the
interests of charitable institutions and of victims of negligence
may be compromised by a rule holding charitable institutions
liable for negligent injuries, but only to the amount of $10,000.
Courts do not compromise interests in this way; rather, judges
are to determine the justice of a particular issue. Of course, in
determining the just solution they are expected to weigh com-
peting interests. However, it would be improper for a court to
announce that since half the justices favor tort immunity for
charitable institutions while half do not, the difference has
been settled by determining that charitable institutions are
liable for one half of the damages caused by their employees'
negligence. Instead, when courts have evenly split decisions,
the extant rule governs.
B. Principles Constitutive of the Standard of Legislative
Questions
The combination of the functional differences between
courts and legislatures, when taken in conjunction with the
considerations underlying the principle of stability, provides
certain principles constitutive of the standard of legislative
questions. These principles concern: (1) The interrelation of
the extant rule with other rules; (2) the complexity of the pro-
posed rule; (3) the scope of the proposed rule; (4) the availabil-
ity of information relevant to the relative desirability of the
extant and proposed rules; and (5) the need for a bright line in
a gray area.48 Another consideration, alternative means of
change, is relevant to differences in judicial activity in reform
of constitutional, statutory, and common law. The ultimate
basis of each of these principles is a functional limit on courts.




The interrelation between the extant rule and others is
relevant to whether judges or legislators should change the ex-
isting rule. The greater a rule's relations and connections with
other rules, the stronger the reason for leaving its change to the
legislature. The reason for this principle is that since courts are
limited to deciding actual cases, court decisions are binding
only insofar as is necessary to decide the instant case. Since the
relationship of a new rule to extant ones will not usually be at
issue in a case, judges' comments upon related extant rules
would be mere obiter dicta. The new rule would be a discontin-
uity in the law casting doubts upon many previously settled
rules, and these doubts could not be resolved until many other
cases had arisen and been decided. A legislature could settle
many of these doubts at the same time it changed the existing
rule in question because a statute need not be limited to as
narrow an issue as a judicial decision.
The principle of interrelation should not be confused with
that of complexity. Complexity refers to whether or not all
elements of a proposed rule may be settled in one decision. For
example, when the Supreme Court recognized an independent
tort action for violation of fourth amendment constitutional
rights, many issues, such as the elements of the damages, were
left unsettled;49 yet the decision did not disturb or affect prior
rules. While a complex new rule cannot be completely fleshed
out in a single court decision (due to the restriction on courts
to deciding actual cases),5" the rule may be fully developed in
a statute, thereby avoiding uncertainty. It should be observed,
however, that complexity is not always a strong reason for leav-
ing a question to a legislature. Arguably, it is preferable to
leave many details to be worked out in light of practical experi-
"' Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
0 "Our decision in this case is to be viewed as a first step in what we deem to be
a proper and just direction, not as a compendium containing the answers to all ques-
tions that may be expected to arise." Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 874 (1975).
Our adoption of this new principle does not, of course, end our judicial
tasks in this area. Subsidiary questions and problems concerning the rela-
tionship of the new rule to other doctrines of tort law must necessarily be
adjudicated in the future. We must, for the most part, await future cases for
the further development of law in this field.
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049-50 (Alas. 1975). The court did, however, abolish
the last clear chance rule.
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ence as cases arise rather than trying to foresee them in a
legislative enactment.5' Furthermore, when legislatures have
acted, they have generally adopted a simple general rule and
left the details to the courts to develop 2 Whether courts or
legislatures should work out the details depends primarily
upon the forseeability of the problems which may arise. To the
extent the problems are not adequately foreseeable, they
should be left to the courts to work out.53 However, it should
generally be left to legislators to initially determine whether
they can foresee problems sufficiently to provide for them by
statute.
The third principle, the scope of the proposed rule, is
closely related to its complexity. Scope and complexity are,
however, distinguishable in that complexity, as previously
mentioned, refers to whether or not all elements of a proposed
rule may be stated in one decision; scope relates to a court's
power to make a change regardless of whether all elements of
the change may be stated in the same decision. Simply stated,
the principle of scope rests upon the limits on courts' personal
jurisdiction and power over resources. An illustration of scope
considerations is found in the dissent of Chief Justice Burger
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics in which it was suggested that a special court be
instituted to handle tort claims for violation of constitutional
rights. 4 No court, however, has the power to establish another
court. Also, due to the considerations of scope, courts should
not undertake to develop a workmen's compensation type sys-
tem for automobile accidents.5 Moreover, no court has adopted
a no fault insurance system by decision. Part of the reason for
such a limitation rests upon the power of courts. They do not
1, "We feel the trial judges of this State are capable of applying this comparative
negligence rule without our setting guidelines in anticipation of expected problems.
The problems are more appropriately resolved at the trial level in a practical manner
instead of a theoretical level at the appellate level." Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431,
439-40 (Fla. 1973); accord, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 874 (1975).
52 R. KEETON, supra note 3, at 50-51; Leflar, Comment on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND.
L. REv. 918, 923 (1968).
5" K. Dn'LocK, THE COURTS AS LEGISLATORS 13 (1965).
51 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971).
"R. KEETON, supra note 3, at 43.
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have the power to require people generally to obtain insurance
or to set the limits of such insurance. On the other hand, the
setting of schedules and the like is not an issue of the scope of
a law but of its complexity, the availability of information, and
the need for a bright line.
A court's lack of information on which to evaluate the
merits of rules is yet an additional reason for leaving questions
to legislatures. For example, one reason courts should not set
schedules of damages is their lack of information about the
general costs of accidents. A court's inability to obtain ade-
quate information pertaining to a particular subject is ulti-
mately founded on the court's lack of power over resources. '
Courts cannot instigate or conduct detailed social scientific
investigations into problems, nor can the litigants in a case
usually afford to do so. Legislatures, on the other hand, do
possess power over resources. If, therefore, a court lacks the
information needed for making a reasonable judgment, the is-
sues under consideration should be deferred to the legislature,
provided it is better able to obtain the needed information.57
The fifth principle is that issues requiring the drawing of
a bright line through a gray area are best left to legislatures.
Any issue which, in justice, requires a rule setting a maximum
Gray, Judicial Legislation: Judicial Constructs and Societal Facts, 31 U. To-
RONTO FACULTY L. REv. 75, 84-87 (1973); Hall, Law Reform and the Judiciary's Role,
10 OsGooDE HALL L.J. 399, 409 (1972). Note the inappropriateness of the adversary
procedure for determining legislative facts, i.e., those needed for evaluating rules as
opposed to those needed for deciding cases under rules.
11 One must be careful not to confuse the availability of information with the kind
of information involved. Hodgson contends that courts work reasonably well without
hearing sociological information or evidence and that it is not desirable for them to
receive it since judges are not specially trained to evaluate it. D. HODGSON, supra note
17, at 137, 149. However, he tends to confuse the valid point that courts are not
empowered to conduct investigations with the invalid one concerning the ability of
judges to make policy decisions on the basis of sociological evidence. The judges would
not primarily be assessing the reliability and accuracy of such evidence, but making
policy decisions on the basis of it. Legislators are no more qualified than are judges to
evaluate the scientific validity of sociological evidence. Moreover, as others correctly
argue, at least in cases of first impression, if judges are to make reasonable decisions
they must consider empirical evidence bearing upon the desirability of alternative
rules. R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 6, at 156-57; Gray, supra note 56, at 82, 87; Hall,
supra note 56, at 405. In cases" which are not of first impression, judges do not have to
decide which of two rules is the more desirable. If they lack information needed for
making a reasonable judgment on the matter, they should defer it to the legislature
provided it is better able to obtain the needed information.
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dollar amount of damages would be such. Likewise, statutes of
limitations set bright temporal lines. To some extent, the draw-
ing of such lines is arbitrary. There is a range in which a line
appropriately belongs, but no particular point can be justified
vis-A-vis others nearby. Consequently, the drawing of such
lines involves a process of compromise between conflicting in-
terests and no justification by means of neutral principles may
be given for drawing it through one part of the gray area rather
than through another. Since these bright line issues are the sort
open to compromise, they are apt to be surrounded with politi-
cal activity. So the rather arbitrary drawing of a bright line by
the judiciary may provoke attacks upon the court. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court decision establishing a constitutional
right to abortions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy
essentially permitted state prohibition of abortion after the
fetus is viable.A8 But Justice Blackmun's suggestion that the
time of viability is twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks has pro-
voked criticism from opponents of abortion. 9 It would un-
doubtedly have been better to allow state legislatures to define
the time of viability, subject to judicial review for reasonable-
ness.
Yet another frequently suggested principle for determining
a legislative question is the availability of alternative means for
changing the extant rule. For example, Shaefer suggests that
one reason courts are more likely to overrule previous constitu-
tional interpretations than they are to overrule statutory ones
is the difficulty involved in otherwise changing a constitution."
Although this consideration is not as significant when directed
to the subject of change of common law rules, such a principle
might be relevant in two respects. First, if a court is uncertain
that it wants to fully reconsider a rule, the likelihood of soon
having another chance to do so might be taken into account.
However, if a court does want to reconsider a rule, it usually
m Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). During the first trimester of pregnancy,
abortion decisions are left to the medical judgment of the attending physician; after
the first trimester, the state mAy regulate the abortion procedure in ways reasonably
related to maternal health.
51 Horan, Gorby, and Hilgers, Abortion and the Supreme Court: Death Becomes
a Way of Life, in ABORTION AND SOCIL JUSTICE 301, 315 (1972).
0 W. SHAmFER, supra note 11, at 11; see also S. MERMIN, supra note 29, at 262.
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will have no difficulty in finding a case in which to do so.
Second, this principle may also be relevant when the legisla-
ture is actively engaged in considering the issue. If the legisla-
ture is soon likely to make a change, it may be appropriate for
a court to defer it.
This raises a consideration much discussed in the cases,
namely, the significance to be attached to legislative inaction.
Sometimes legislative inaction is taken to indicate satisfaction
with the law. However, it can also be interpreted as indicative
of a legislative desire for courts to assume the responsibility of
making any needed changes. If a legislature has voted on a bill
proposing a change, then it may seem more reasonable to con-
strue its failure to change the law as indicating satisfaction
with it. However, there are extreme difficulties in knowing why
a legislature has not passed a bill." Moreover, the pressure
upon legislatures to act in various areas has increased during
this century, making it extremely difficult for legislators to
devote time to law reform, especially when there are no pres-
sure groups pushing for change in certain areas of private law. 2
Rupert Cross suggests that the system of case law is workable
only on the assumption that when it breaks down under the
dead weight of precedent, amending legislation will be avail-
able.6 3 Assuming this to be true, courts will have to overrule
more decisions than previously to keep the legal system viable
when legislatures are unable to act. Consequently, courts must
decide on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the situation when
to make changes themselves and when to leave them to legisla-
tures.
The issue of legislative inaction is frequently thought to be
most perplexing when in earlier decisions a court has expressed
a preference for a new rule, but has declined to overrule preced-
ents. The issue in this context, however, is spurious. If the court
considered prospective overruling and declined to overrule pre-
cedent because of the principle of stability, then it should not
prefer, everything considered, a change in the rule. If it failed
, See Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (Ore. 1966).
62 R. KEETON, supra note 3, at 16-17; Leflar, supra note 52, at 928. For an extensive
analysis of reasons for legislative inaction, see Peck, The Role of the Courts and
Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. Rsv. 265, 268-85 (1963).
13 R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 218 (2d ed. 1968).
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to consider prospective overruling, then it should do so in the
next appropriate case. If the court declined to overrule preced-
ent because, when considered in light of the appropriate princi-
ples, the issue was determined to be a legislative question, then
the issue should still be left to the legislature. In short, legisla-
tive inaction should not be a special bar to judicial change:
Either the principle of stability militates against the change
and only the legislature should make it; or the court was wrong
not to have made the change previously.
Thus far, five principles have been considered as constitut-
ing a standard to be utilized in a determination as to which
types of issues are more appropriately resolved by legislatures
than by courts. 4 However, there is a general argument that
since the common law rules were originally promulgated by
courts, not legislatures, courts are the only bodies competent
to consider the proposed changes. Change of the common law,
therefore, could never be a legislative question. This argument,
however, overlooks the probability of changed circumstances.
A rule's interrelations with other rules may have developed
over time, so that a current change in it may have much wider
ramifications in the legal system than did its original adoption.
Similar considerations apply when the principle of complexity
is regarded. Moreover, the availability of information may be
much more crucial now than it was at the time of the rule's
initial adoption. The development of sociology and economics
has made it possible to obtain information not obtainable in
the nineteenth century. Also, the proposed rule may require
such information for an evaluation of its merits, while alterna-
tive rules considered when the existing rule was originally pro-
mulgated did not. Hence, the fact that an extant rule is a court-
91 One might contend that Dworkin's distinction between arguments based on
principles and those based on policies should be a sixth principle, since only legisla-
tures should make decisions involving policy considerations. See Dworkin, supra note
39. However, even if one accepts the distinction of the rights thesis between principle
and policy, it has little relevance to common law rules. Since, if the descriptive version
of Dworkin's rights thesis is correct, that rules were adopted on the basis of rights, it
is likely that such considerations, rather than policies, would be the ground for chang-
ing them. For example, the standard argument in favor of a comparative rather than
a contributory negligence system is based upon a more just application of the prin-
ciple of fault. A legislative question would be involved only if policy considerations had
arisen for changing a rule; for example, limiting damages in medical malpractice suits.
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made one is not dispositive in a determination of whether its
change is a legislative question. At best, a basis is provided for
skepticism of the claim that courts should not alter common
law rules. Thus, the basic principles which constitute the stan-
dard of a legislative question should be applied in each case.
CONCLUSION
The proper role of courts in reform of the common law has
been neglected by legal philosophers. The confusions inherent
in the doctrine of stare decisis have generally prevented courts
from developing a clearly articulated rationale for their action
or inaction in reform of the common law. In particular, the
doctrine of stare decisis confuses the principle of stability with
the standard of legislative questions. Such a confusion is natu-
ral, for if courts decide that the law should not be changed
(principle of stability), change must emanate from the legisla-
ture (legislative question). However, if courts may engage in
prospective overruling, then the principle of stability provides
no stronger a reason against judicial than against legislative
change.6 5 The standard of legislative questions does provide a
65 At this point it should be noted that there is a general argument that courts
should not overrule precedents or at least should be very cautious in so doing because
courts, as compared to legislatures, are undemocratic institutions. Legislators must
frequently stand for reelection, whereas some judges are not elected and those who are
generally have long terms of office. Consequently, it is claimed that courts do not
reflect the will of the people as well as legislatures and should not be involved in
lawmaking.
Since a complete consideration of this argument would require a complex analysis
of political theory, only a few brief points may be made here. First, historically, the
law developed primarily by judicial decision rather than by legislative enactment. The
discussion herein has been explicitly restricted to judicially created common law. If
judges were historically competent to make law, then they may be presumed to be
competent to do so now absent a showing that changed social circumstances render
the matter a legislative question. Second, the value of public representation is greatest
when various competing interests need to be compromised. The principle of a need for
a bright line covers many of these situations. Such compromise is also important in
decisions about governmental spending, but courts do not make such decisions. Third,
and most significantly, the argument that courts, as undemocratic institutions, should
not overrule precedents is not directly relevant either to the principle of stability or
to the standard of legislative questions. The principle of stability provides a reason
against change of the law which is applicable to both courts and legislatures. Further-
more, even if the general argument provides a good but not conclusive reason against
judicial change of the law, it does not help in distinguishing between those questions
which courts should handle and those which are legislative questions. Consequently,
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basis for distinguishing rules which courts ought not undertake
to change from those which they may. If the change of a rule
is a legislative question, then courts are not qualified to deter-
mine the relative merits of proposed and extant rules. Conse-
quently, it is inappropriate for courts to declare that although
a particular common law rule should be changed, it is a legisla-
tive question.
The proper role of courts of final review in reform of the
common law is greater than most of them seem to realize. If
the standard of legislative questions is applied realistically, few
issuem of change of the common law will be found to be legisla-
tive questions. If the common law is arcane and inadequate for
social conditions, the blame will frequently be placed upon the
nonfeasance or malfeasance of contemporary judges. The
blame can rarely be passed to legislatures under the guise of
the issue being a legislative question.
Legal philosophers cannot reform the law, but they may
help by sorting out the distinct considerations involved in de-
ciding to overrule precedent. The courts must still apply these
considerations to actual cases. There is considerable evidence
that judges on courts of final review in the United States are
becoming aware of their responsibilities in reform of the com-
mon law. A well considered judicial activism in common law
reform will benefit the public at large.
unless the argument proves that courts should never overrule precedents, it at best
provides a principle against judicial change which is distinct from the principle of
stability and the standard of legislative questions.
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